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THE NINTH CIRCUIT ABANDONS M'NAGHTEN
Ever since that fateful day in 1843 when Daniel M'Naghten fired
his errant shot at Sir Robert Peel, the common law courts have struggled
with the problem of insanity as a defense to criminal prosecutions.'
Today, more than a century later, it sometimes seems that scant progress
has been made toward a successful reconciliation between current psy-
chological knowledge and the administration of criminal justice.'
Insanity in Criminal Prosecutions
As handed down by the House of Lords, the rule of M'Naghten's
Case3 came to be universally recognized in this country as the proper
standard by which to measure an individual's mental capacity to com-
mit crime.4 A defendant who had committed the proscribed act would
not be held to answer if it could be established that he lacked what has
come to be called cogitive capacity-if, that is to say, it could be
proven either that he did not know what he was doing, or if he did
know, that as a result of some delusion he did not know that what he
was doing was wrong. Soon thereafter, as the plea of insanity came
more and more into use-and as the shortcomings of M'Naghten be-
came more and more apparent-some jurisdictions formulated the ir-
resistible impulse test to supplement M'Naghten. Even though he was
not exculpated by application of the M'Naghten rule, a defendant
could still escape punishment if he could show that at the time of
the commission of the act he was unable to control his conduct. The
M'Naghten rule, with or without the irresistible impulse modification,
served the country well into the twentieth century. But the advent
of modem psychology brought with it a torrent of criticism of the right-
wrong test. As the science of psychology became more refined,
M'Naghten came to lose many of its adherents. 5 Like many legal
1. For a discussion of mental disease in the criminal law before M'Naghten,
see R.VPEKNS, CRMINAL LAw 852-58 (2d ed. 1969).
2. This topic has been the subject of endless commentary. For a comprehen-
sive symposium of various points of view, see Insanity and the Criminal Law-a Critique
of Durham v. United States, 22 U. Cr. L. REV. 317 (1955).
3. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
4. "[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong." Id. at 722.
5. See, e.g., S. GLUECE, MENTAL Disoum AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925); A.
problems, however, the recognition of the shortcomings of the rule did
not necessarily sound its death knell, at least not until an acceptable
substitute could be found. The M'Naghten rule therefore remains very
much alive as the search for such a substitute continues.
A landmark departure from the right-wrong test was taken by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1953 in Durham v.
United States.6 Under the Durham rule, a defendant is not criminally
responsible for unlawful conduct that was the "product" of mental dis-
ease or defect. Due to the causation problems it creates for the trier of
fact, however, this "product" rule met with the approval of few outside
the medical profession. The Durham test is used by only two other
jurisdictions.7 Shortly after Durham, in 1955, the American Law In-
stitute (ALI), in its tentative draft for the Model Penal Code, proposed
what is commonly known as the "substantial capacity" test.' Under
this test, a person is responsible for criminal conduct unless as a result
of some mental defect he lacked "substantial capacity" to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act, or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law. The Durham and the ALI formulations are by no means the
only feasible replacements for M'Naghten; but they have attracted the
greatest attention-if not support-and all decisions discussing an al-
ternative to M'Naghten must inevitably deal with them.
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The search for a more suitable definition of exculpatory insanity9
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 67-79 (1967); Diamond, Criminal Responsibility
of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REV. 59 (1961).
6. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "The rule ... is simply that an accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect." Id. at 874-75. This rule was further clarified in McDonald v. United
States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962), which defined "mental disease or defect" as "any
abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional proc-
esses and substantially impairs behavior controls." Id. at 851.
7. The Durham rule is essentially the test that has existed since 1870 in New
Hampshire. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). Maine has adopted Durham by stat-
ute. 15 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 5, § 102 (1964).
8. "(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
"(2) As used in this Article, the terms, 'mental disease or defect' do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con-
duct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft, 1962). In the tentative draft first
presented to the American Law Institute in May 1955 the language was identical to
that quoted above except for the addition of the phrase "As used in this Article" and the
addition of the substitute word "wrongfulness" after the term "criminality" in the final
draft.
9. The proposed substitutes for M'Naghten are legion, but an evaluation of their
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led the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to its decision in Wade v.
United States.10 Wade was an en banc decision in which the court, by
a narrow seven-to-six margin, abandoned its long-standing version of
the M'Naghten rule' in favor of the ALI "substantial capacity" formu-
lation.' 2
In an extremely well-documented opinion, Judge Ely, writing for
the majority, clearly implied that the Ninth Circuit had long been anx-
ious to reappraise M'Naghten;13 contrary to the view it expressed 13
years earlier, the court no longer felt foreclosed from making the reap-
praisal.'4 The majority in Wade made much of the fact that with the
exception of the First Circuit, no other federal appellate court retains
M'Naghten in its traditional form'5 (six of the circuits have replaced
M'Naghten in only the last 4 years). The recent trend toward discard-
relative merits is outside the scope of this note. For such an evaluation, see Diamond,
From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 189 (1962); Wechsler,
The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CH L. R v. 367 (1955). For an
argument that M'Naghten should be retained, see Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irre-
placeable: Recent Events In the Law of Incapacity, 50 GEO. L.L 105 (1961).
10. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
11. The Ninth Circuit version of M'Naghten can be found in Maxwell v. United
States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966), stated as follows: "'Insane,' as here used,
means such a perverted and deranged condition of a person's mental and moral faculties
as to render him either incapable of knowing the nature of the act he is committing; or
where he is conscious of the nature of the act he is committing and able to distinguish
between right and wrong, and knows the act is wrong, yet his will, by which I mean the
governing power of his mind, has been so completely destroyed that his actions are not
subject to it, but are beyond his control." Id. at 741 n.7.
12. At his trial for bank robbery, Wade had requested an instruction in terms of
the ALI formulation; this was refused and the instruction patterned after Maxwell was
given instead. 426 F.2d at 65.
13. See Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1968), where the ma-
jority in a 5-4 decision held that the issue of M'Naghten's validity had not been properly
raised. Judge Ely refers to this case as the last instance in which the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered the validity of M'Naghten. 426 F.2d at 65.
14. "At one time, it was suggested that reexamination of the M'Naghten rules
was foreclosed by decisions of the Supreme Court.... Nevertheless, after our Sauer
decision [Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940
(1957)], one circuit after another has rejected the M'Naghten rules and has persua-
sively demonstrated that the Supreme Court has never set a fixed standard of criminal
responsibility." 426 F.2d at 67.
15. The District of Columbia Circuit has Durham. Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Second Circuit has adopted the American Law
Institute proposal. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). The
Third Circuit has adopted what is essentially the ALI formulation minus the require-
ment that the defendant appreciate the criminality of his act. United States v. Cur-
rens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). The Fourth through the Seventh Circuits have
adopted the ALI definition. United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968);
Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d
720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967). The
March 19711 CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ingM'Naghten was doubtless a primary factor in the Wade court's de-
cision. 16  Judge Ely wasted few words on M'Naghten. He simply
termed its shortcomings apparent 17 and cited a plethora of cases criti-
cizing the rule. He then undertook a lengthy evaluation of the alter-
native insanity definitions, 8 and concluded that "substantial capacity"
was the best available. 19
Although it accepted the ALI formulation, the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the Model Penal Code section
4.01 definition of insanity and rejected the second paragraph thereof.2"
That is to say, the court refused to exclude from its definition of in-
sanity all "abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal activ-
ity." To follow the Model Penal Code in this regard, the court
thought, could result in the imprisonment without treatment of indi-
viduals having great potential for recidivism, and would make the en-
tire definition "confusing and ambiguous to jurors."21
Eighth Circuit has severely limited M'Naghten. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710
(8th Cir. 1967). The Tenth Circuit has modernized M'Naghten and equated it to the
ALI formulation. Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 946 (1964).
16. "We have concluded that we should no longer stand virtually alone.
426 F.2d at 65.
17. "The M'Naghten rules fruitlessly attempt to relieve from punishment only
those mentally diseased persons who have no cognitive capacity-those who are unable
to know the nature and quality of their acts or that the acts were wrong. This formula-
tion does not comport with modern medical knowledge that an individual is a mentally
complex being with varying degrees of awareness." Id. at 66.
18. Judge Ely reviewed Durham, Currens, and the ALI definition. Id. at 68-70. In
his dissent, Judge Trask reviewed the definition offered by Judge (now Chief Justice)
Burger in a concurring opinion in Blocker v. United Sates, 288 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C.
Cir. 1961). 426 F.2d at 76. In Blocker, Chief Justice Burger proposed the following:
"The defendant is not to be found guilty as charged unless it is established beyond a
reasonable doubt that when he committed the act, first, that he understood and appre-
ciated that the act was a violation of law, and second, that he had the capacity to exercise
his will and to choose not to do it. If, because of some abnormal mental condition,
either of these elements is lacking, he cannot be found guilty. To hold him guilty the
jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, both that he understood and appreciated the
act charged was a violation of law and that he possessed the capacity or competence to
choose to do it or refrain from doing it." 288 F.2d at 871.
19. The court stated by way of dictum that the "substantial capacity" criterion
would be afforded limited retroactivity, and would apply only to cases that had not be-
come final before the date of decision. 426 F.2d at 73-74.
20. Id. at 71-73. See note 8 supra.
21. The Wade court surprisingly failed to discuss the effects of this deletion. It
was concerned that the inclusion of this second paragraph would result in imprisonment
of these defendants without proper psychiatric treatment and would return them to so-
ciety with a high probability of recidivism. But it showed little concern for the alterna-
tive, i.e., that by deleting this second paragraph the resultant more liberal definition
would allow these same criminals with a history of repeated criminal conduct to be
acquitted by reason of insanity and to be freed without treatment. See id. at 72-73.
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In an equally lengthy dissent,22 Judge Trask, joined by five other
dissenters, chided the majority for abandoning an old friend and for
jumping onto the bandwagon with the other courts of appeals. In the
dissenters' view, the M'Naghten rule, as applied in the Ninth Circuit,2"
withstood the traditional criticism of a simple right-wrong test. In the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Trask maintained, all relevant psychiatric evi-
dence-the "entire action pattern of a man"---was admissible under
the formulation of M'Naghten which included an irresistible impulse
test modernized by the phrase "uncontrollable act."
Although the dissenters did not appear to favor M'Naghten over
many of the possible alternatives, they particularly disliked the use of
the word "substantial" in the ALI formulation.24 Apprehensions con-
cerning the liberality of the Model Penal Code's definition led Judge
Trask to a discussion of a most serious problem within the federal
criminal system. Believing that broad interpretation of the word "sub-
stantial" in the ALI definition will inevitably lead to more acquittals
on the ground of insanity, Judge Trask concluded that before the ALI
definition is adopted, there should be some procedure for the commit-
ment of defendants acquitted by reason of insanity in federal prosecu-
tions.25
Not surprisingly, the majority in Wade took an opposite view. In
a cursory treatment of the subject, Judge Ely recognized the lack of
federal post-acquittal commitment procedures, but nevertheless con-
cluded:
The paramount and controlling factor is that we cannot abdicate
our judicial responsibility by prolonging an antiquated common law
rule of criminal responsibility merely because legislation on col-
lateral matters is still pending.23
Is a Federal Post-Acquittal Procedure Constitutional?
What role the presence or absence of a federal post-acquittal com-
mitment procedure should play in the determination of insanity cri-
teria is a subject for much more extensive study. In this brief Note,
22. Judges Barnes, Chambers, and Kilkenny each wrote separate dissents.
23. See note 11 supra.
24. Should M'Naghten be abandoned, the dissenters would replace it with the
formulation recommended by the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. 426
F.2d at 76.
25. The minority criticizes the majority for adopting the ALI definition of in-
sanity, without giving enough weight to that group's further recommendation in section
4.08 of the Model Penal Code of a commitment procedure. See 426 F.2d at 75-84
(Trask, J. dissenting).
26. 426 F.2d at 73.
27. That the absence of a post-acquittal procedure has in the past deterred the
federal courts from liberalizing M'Naghten is beyond doubt. For example, the Ninth
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the discussion will be confined to the actual possibility of such a pro-
cedure-the establishment of which was advocated by the entire Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
While they found little else to agree upon, the two sides in Wade
both seem to agree upon the necessity of an effective method for deal-
ing with acquitted defendants, who by their own admission were, at one
point in time at least, mentally incompetent. But despite this unanim-
ity of opinion, the eventual establishment of such a procedure is far
from certain, as its absence from present federal statutes indicates.
Resort to the insanity defense by any significant proportion of fed-
eral defendants is a relatively new phenomenon.2 8 Until relatively re-
cent times, the insanity issue was raised primarily in state proceedings.
This was because most of the crimes in which insanity ordinarily plays a
part are prosecuted under the police power of the individual states.29
Extensive experience with the problem has led the states to develop,
again under the authority of their police powers, rather elaborate pro-
cedures for dealing with mental incompetents not subject to criminal
liability.30
As a result of the enormous growth of federal regulation of indi-
vidual conduct within the last 30 years, the defense of insanity has been
raised more and more frequently in the federal courts. Recognizing
this trend, Congress in 1949 enacted measures designed to cope with
the insane before and during the criminal process, justifying its action
on the constitutional ground that such legislation was necessary and
proper for the efficient functioning of the federal courts.3 Conspicu-
ously absent from the 1949 legislation, and conspicuously absent ever
since, was a procedure for dealing with mentally incompetent defendants
after the criminal process had been completed-that is, after an acquit-
tal on the ground of insanity. It has, consequently, devolved upon the
Circuit itself has said: "Many observers implicitly assume in their criticism of present
law that if the accused is set free on the criminal side that he will be confined on the civil.
Unfortunately, that is not the case. If it were, this court might be much more disposed
to alter its current views. The choice today in this jurisdiction is not between confine-
ment and commitment, but rather between confinement and freedom." Sauer v. United
States, 241 F.2d 640, 650 (9th Cir. 1967).
28. See Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Ad-
ministration, 53 YALE L.J. 684 (1944).
29. Id. at 684.
30. Note, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquitted and Committed Because of
Insanity: The Need for Balanced Administration, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 306-07 (1958).
Tennessee is the only state without such a procedure. Id. at 306.
31. Act of Sept. 7, 1949, ch. 535, 63 Stat. 686 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-48
(1964) ). These measures were declared constitutional by the Supreme Court under
the necessary and proper clause. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375-76
(1956).
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states to assume jurisdiction "on the courthouse steps," as it were, over
these defendants for the purpose of affording them psychological re-
habilitation.
The widespread (although by no means certain) state practice
of accepting the responsibility for dealing with defendants acquitted of
federal crimes on the ground of insanity no doubt acounts to some ex-
tent for the lack of federal legislation on the matter. But until recently,
by far the greatest obstacle to such federal legislation was its assumed
constitutional infirmity. On what constitutional basis could federal au-
thorities commit an insane defendant after he has been acquitted and the
federal prosecution has by definition come to an end? Underlying the
absence of congressional legislation on this subject has been the widely-
held belief that only in the police power can such authority be found-
a power specifically reserved to the states.
32
Recently two bills have been introduced in Congress that would
have provided for federal post-acquittal commitment procedures. 33 Al-
though both bills expired in committee, they were based on tenable
constitutional foundations and could possibly have withstood consti-
tutional challenge.34 The late Senator Robert F. Kennedy introduced
a bill providing for commitment of an acquitted federal defendant if it
could be shown that he endangered "the safety of the officers, property,
or other interests of the United States."35 This proposal, while stand-
ing on fairly solid constitutional ground by requiring a federal interest
to be involved, left a large gap in situations in which the defendant
would be considered dangerous only to himself or to the population in
general. Such a gap, into which most cases can be expected to fall,
could only be filled by a very broad and very tenuous definition of fed-
eral interest, and even then such a definition would be difficult to ap-
ply in particular cases.
The former Senator Joseph Tydings introduced a very similar pro-
posal, under which commitment procedures would be available for any
defendant who met the single requirement of being dangerous to him-
self or others.3" When the reasoning behind the Tydings legislation
is examined, it becomes clear that it is the sounder proposal of the
two. Tydings argued, contrary to widespread opinion, that the neces-
32. E.g., Higgins v. United States, 205 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1953); Edwards
v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 382, 383 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
33. S. 3689 & S. 3753, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
34. See Note, Federal Commitment of Defendants Found Not Guilty By Rea-
son of Insanity-Proposed Legislation, 52 IowA L. REV. 930 (1967); Tydings, A Fed-
eral Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and a Subsequent Commitment Pro-
cedure, 27 MD. L. REV. 131 (1967).
35. S. 3689, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § (b) (1966).
36. S. 3753, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § (d) (1966).
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sary and proper clause could constitutionally support commitment at
this "end" stage of the judicial process. Speaking of the differentia-
tion between federal and non-federal interest in the Kennedy bill, Tyd-
ings said:
If such a differentiation is necessary to insure the constitutionality
of a Federal commitment, I would endorse it, for almost any
commitment procedure would be better than the present void in
Federal law. However, I do not believe that it is clear that such
a differentiation is necessary in order to insure constitutionality.
The person found dangerous after acquittal because of insanity
came to public attention through the alleged commission of what
would be, but for the element of mental irresponsibility, a Federal
crime. The Federal interest should be strong enough in that indi-
vidual to allow Federal control of the person until his release will
not endanger society. Moreover, a Federal problem, a person who
allegedly committed a violation of Federal law, should not be
foisted upon the States for solution.3 7
Neither the Kennedy nor the Tydings bill, both introduced in 1966,
was enacted into law. But since 1966, six federal appellate courts have
liberalized their insanity definitions by dropping M'Naghten.'8 It is a
safe assumption that such action, which quite naturally raises concerns
like those expressed by Judge Trask, coupled with the federal bench's
continual requests for congressional action39 in this area, will result in
some sort of federal commitment procedure closely approximating
either the Kennedy or the Tydings proposal.
Either a broad procedure that would reach almost all defendants
acquitted of a federal crime by reason of insanity, or a narrower proce-
dure that requires the recognition of a federal interest is needed. Not
only do the reasons expressed by Judge Trask require some such enact-
ment, but also the lack of such a procedure may postpone a careful ex-
amination of the question of the scientifically proper definition of crim-
inal insanity by the federal courts.
Stephen A. McFeely*
37. 112 CONG. REc. 20,293 (1966) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
38. See note 15 supra.
39. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 73 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Freeman, 357
F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966).
* Member, Second Year Class
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